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Abstract 
 
 
This paper examines women’s contribution to war and the perceptions of that contribution 
by comparing experiences of women in the Red Army during the Second World War and in 
the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the conflict in the Donbas region. Although the two cases 
discussed refer to very different conflicts, separated by seventy years, the similarity in 
servicewomen’s experiences of warfare is striking. The paper demonstrates that in both cases 
women were perceived as a helping force, regardless of the roles they performed. Individual 
women who did not fit into the auxiliary category were singled out as exceptional, but their 
existence did not challenge gender stereotypes. Through comparative analysis, the paper 
argues that in both cases structural gender discrimination was ingrained in the military, which 
accepted women’s contribution to war in times of need, but treated that contribution as 
subsidiary, thereby distorting men’s and women’s experiences of warfare, and facilitating the 
instrumentalised militarization of women.  
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Women’s relationship to war is more complex than men’s “because society with its traditional 
gender divisions of labor has assigned the official task of fighting to men,” argues Nicole Ann 
Dombrowski.2 This does not mean, of course, that women do not fight in wars. As Simone de 
Beauvoir puts it in her now classic text, historically, “women were known to take part in 
bloody wars or vendettas; they showed as much courage and cruelty as males”.3 The problem 
of women’s invisibility as actors of political violence, therefore, is not in their supposed 
inability to fight in wars. The problem is in societies’ ongoing inability to see women in the 
roles that do not fit traditional gender norms. De Beauvoir herself and many scholars before 
and especially after her have tried to make women visible in all spheres of life, including 
warfare. Nevertheless, the dilemma of how to represent women in the context of war 
persists. If non-military (although not necessarily not militarized) women are usually fitted 
into categories of civilian victims and mothers-sisters-daughters-lovers-wives of military men, 
those who become members of the military are usually perceived as exceptional female 
warriors.4 Indeed, female members of the military are relatively rare, but, as Barbara Alpern 
Engel argues they form “a substantial minority”.5 Ignoring them because of their numerical 
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Dombrowski, ed., Women and War in the Twentieth Century. Enlisted with or without Consent (New York: 
Routledge, 2004): 138-159, (138). 
inferiority would mean neglecting war stories of thousands of individuals, who can offer a 
narrative of war different to the customary heroic tale of male glory on the battlefield. 
However, emphasizing their participation in war carries the danger of hailing them precisely 
as extraordinary, thereby strengthening the assumption that “ordinary” women are 
inherently peaceful and that the job of fighting wars should be reserved for men whose 
gender predisposes them to soldiering. The ways in which these dilemmas are dealt with (or 
ignored) are indicative of the attitude of state and society towards its female citizens.  
In this paper, I examine perceptions of servicewomen’s contributions to war by 
comparing two cases: women in the Red Army during the Second World War and in the 
Ukrainian Armed Forces in the conflict in the Donbas region. In spite of their distance in time 
and the difference in scale and type of the respective conflicts, the similarities in the two cases 
are startling. I focus on the discrepancy between the contribution of women to the war effort 
and the perception of this contribution within their respective societies, and demonstrate 
that in both cases, regardless of their roles in warfare, women were perceived as an auxiliary 
force, supporting men in fighting wars. Specific individual women who did not fit into the 
auxiliary category have been presented as exceptional, but rather than challenging gender 
stereotypes, accentuation of their exceptionality has been more likely to reinforce the general 
perception of women’s contribution as essentially supportive. I argue that structural gender 
discrimination was ingrained in the military, which accepted women’s contribution to war in 
times of need, but treated that contribution as subsidiary. Such auxiliarization of women’s 
contribution to war on the one hand, and the turning of others into exceptional heroines, 
reinforces male participation in war as the norm, distorts the reality of war as experienced by 
both women and men, and facilitates the instrumentalised militarization of women. There is 
a significant body of literature analyzing the participation of women in the Red Army. It is rich 
in detail about the types of roles women performed and the attitude the Soviet state adopted 
towards their recruitment.6 The literature on the contemporary servicewomen in the Donbas 
is much scarcer, and I will rely on the few published sources available to date.7 In both cases, 
I will refer to interviews with the former servicewomen, which I collected in 2015-16, and 
other sources such as published interviews or media material.  
Servicewomen’s partial visibility in the two cases discussed here means that exact 
numbers for them are not known. The Red Army estimates vary significantly. Oleg Budnitskii 
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the Second World War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Oleg Budnitskii, “Muzhchiny i zhenshchiny v 
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Invisible Battalion,” Ukraine Analytica 1(7) (2017): 29-37; Marta Havryshko, “Henderne nasyl’stvo v 
partnerstvakh viis’kovych: naratyv zhinky, iaka vyzhyla,” [Gender violence in military partnerships: the 
narrative of a woman who survived], Povaha. Kampania proty seksyzmu, 14 September 2016, 
http://povaha.org.ua/henderne-nasylstvo-v-partnerstvah-vijskovyh-naratyv-zhinky-yaka-vyzhyla/, accessed 19 
June 2017; Marta Havryshko, “Mistsevi zhinky ta cholovichyi komfort u zoni zbroinoho konfliktu,” [Local 
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Ukraine” in Lynne Attwood, Marina Yusupova, Elisabeth Schimpfoessl, eds., Gender and Choice in the Post-
Soviet Context, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming). Unless otherwise stated, all translations are 
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relies on an official Soviet state estimate and states that “according to the Ministry of 
Defense, 490,235 women were called up by the army and the navy during the war”.8 Anna 
Krylova argues that more than 900,000 women served in the Soviet Armed Forces during 
WWII.9 Roger D. Markwick and Euridice Charon-Cardona offer an even higher estimate. They 
state that  
[b]etween August 1941 and October 1944, the GKO [State Defense Committee] and 
NKO [People’s Commissariat for Defense] decreed the mobilization of an estimated 
712,529 women for the Red Army and Navy […]. 463,503 were still in the Red Army as 
at 1 January 1945; 318,980 of these women were actually on the fighting front. If we 
add the 512,161 “civilian volunteers” (volnonaemny[i] sostav) in the Red Army, but 
not in the Red Navy, as at 1 January 1945 (medical, food, supplies, laundry and repair 
personnel, etc.) […] the total number of women who served with the Soviet armed 
forces in the course of the war was just in excess of one million.10 
The number that is usually quoted in literature about Red Army women is 800,000.11  
In the Ukrainian case, there is also no clear figure for the participation of women in 
what is officially known as the anti-terrorist operation (ATO).12 According to the Ministry of 
                                                 
8 Budnitskii, “Muzhchiny i zhenshchiny v Krasnoi Armii,” para. 15. 
9 Krylova, Soviet Women in Combat, 169. 
10 Markwick and Charon-Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline, 150. These figures are only for the regular 
army and do not include the partisans. Markwick and Charon-Cardona estimate that there were 28,000 women 
in the Soviet partisan units. See Markwick and Charon-Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline, 1.  
11 See Martin Mccauley, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union (London: Routledge, 2014); Barbara Evans 
Clements, Bolshevik Women (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Amnon Sella, The Value of 
Human Life in Soviet Warfare (London: Routledge, 2005).  
12 The military hostilities in the Donbas, which started in April 2014 and are ongoing at the time of writing, are 
referred to in everyday speech in Ukraine as a war. The official term used by the Ukrainian authorities and 
much of the media was Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) until October 2017, when it was replaced by “security 
Defence of Ukraine, as of 9 October 2017, 6,282 women had received the “status of 
participants of military action for their participation in the anti-terrorist operation”.13 This 
figure, however, did not include a number of categories of servicewomen: those who served 
in the warzone illegally, volunteers who worked at the frontline irregularly, around 500 
women who were part of the National Guard, and those who were part of the Ukrainian 
Armed Forces but did not serve in the “ATO zone” for any lengthy period of time.14 Indeed, 
Maria Berlins’ka, who is one of the researchers of the first sociological study of women who 
are fighting in the Donbas region, says that no one has objective figures for servicewomen 
                                                 
operations for the reestablishment of sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the country”. For further 
discussion see Nataliya Lebid’, “Vzhe ne ATO, ale shche ne viina”, [No longer ATO, but not war yet] Ukraina 
moloda, 6 October 2017, http://www.umoloda.kiev.ua/number/3221/180/116472/, accessed 29 October 
2017. 
13 Official response of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine to author’s information request, 9 October 2017, 
author’s private archive. 
14 As of November 2017, 55,629 women were employed by the Ukrainian Armed Forces (around 2,400 of 
whom joined in 2017). While many of them hold civilian posts, 24,298 (almost 10 per cent of total military 
personnel) hold military positions. Almost 3,000 women are officers, and there are no women generals. See “U 
Zbroinykh Sylakh Ukrainy prokhodiat’ viis’kovu sluzhbu i pratsiuiut’ 55629 zhinok,” [55,629 women serve and 
work in the Armed Forces of Ukraine], Ukrainian Military Pages, 22 November 2017, 
http://www.ukrmilitary.com/2017/11/female-soldiers.html, accessed 9 January 2017; “Chysel’nist’ ukrains’koi 
armii nablyzhaiet’sia do ‘zakonodavchoho limitu’,” [The number of Ukrainian army personnel is approaching 
the “legislative limit”], Ukrinform, 3 October 2017, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/2317217-
ciselnist-ukrainskoi-armii-nablizaetsa-do-zakonodavcogo-limitu.html, accessed 9 January 2018; “V armii maie 
sluzhyty stil’ky zhinok, skil’ky bazhaie, - ministr oborony Ukrainy,” [The army should recruit all women who are 
willing to serve - Minister of Defense of Ukraine], Povaha. Kampaniia proty seksyzmu, 24 November 2017, 
http://povaha.org.ua/v-armiji-maje-sluzhyty-stilky-zhinok-skilky-bazhaje-ministr-oborony-ukrajiny/, accessed 9 
January 2018; “V ZSU pochaly rozrobku bilyzny dlia viis’kovykh-zhinok,” [Ukrainian Armed Forces start 
developing underwear for servicewomen], TSN, 28 September 2017, https://tsn.ua/ukrayina/u-zsu-pochali-
rozrobku-bilizni-dlya-viyskovih-zhinok-999855.html, accessed 9 January 2018. See also M. Berlins’ka, Tamara 
Martsenyuk, Anna Kvit, and Ganna Grytsenko, ‘Nevydymyi batal’ion’: Uchast’ zhinok u viis’kovykh diiakh v ATO 
(Ukr.), ‘Invisible Battalion’: Women’s Participation in ATO Military Operations (Eng.), (Kyiv: Ukrainian Women’s 
Fund, 2016). 
engaged in the “ATO” because of their complex status at the frontline.15  
In the cases of both the Red Army in WWII and the conflict in Donbas, most women 
who joined the conflicts did so voluntarily. Reina Pennington states that “[l]egal precedents 
in the Soviet Union made it possible for women to fight. Women’s political and legal equality 
was guaranteed by the constitution of 1918, which also established universal military service 
for men, and voluntary military service for women.”16 The Vsevobuch 
(Vseobshchee voennoe obuchenie, Universal Military Training Administration) aimed to 
ensure that citizens between eighteen and forty years of age receive military training, 
Osoaviakhim (Obshchestvo sodeistviia oborone, aviatsyonnomu i khimicheskomu 
stroitel’stvu, Union for Assistance with Defense and Aviation-Chemical Construction) 
provided paramilitary training for civilians and Komsomol (Vsesoiuznyi leninskii 
kommunisticheskii soiuz molodezhy, All-Union Leninist Young Communist League) “was 
charged with instilling political militancy in the young”.17 Women took part in all of these. 
When the Soviet-German war broke out, many women of the generation who grew up 
persuaded by the state that the war was imminent and that all citizens had to prepare for it 
rushed to seek ways to contribute to the war effort. However, as Markwick and Charon-
Cardona point out, “[t]o the profound disappointment of most politically active young 
                                                 
15 Maria Berlins’ka in “Viina – tse tezh zhinocha sprava, i nashi zhinky na fronti voiuiut’ dobre, - avtorky proektu 
‘Nevydymyi batal’ion’,” [The war is also a woman’s business, and our women are fighting well at the frontline - 
authors of the “Invisible Battalion” project],  Hromads’ke Radio, 9 June 2017, 
https://hromadskeradio.org/programs/hromadska-hvylya/viyna-ce-i-zhinocha-sprava-v-nas-na-fronti-ye-
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Berlins’ka, Martsenyuk, Kvit and Grytsenko, “‘Nevydymyi batal’ion’: uchast’ zhinok u viis’kovykh diiakh v ATO”. 
16 Pennington, “Offensive Women,” 779. 
17 Markwick and Charon-Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline, 14. See also, Pennington, “Offensive 
Women,” 779.  
women, when the hour came to exercise their rights to bear arms alongside their menfolk, 
they were rebuffed.”18 In the USSR, gender equality was proclaimed in principle, but not 
implemented in practice. As Pennington states, “women were usually relegated to lower-
ranking positions at work and filled many traditional women’s roles at work and at home.”19 
Anne Eliot Griesse and Richard Stites argue that “[p]ronatalist, sexist, and suspicious of 
spontaneity, Stalinism assured that the Soviet high command would have a deeply ambivalent 
attitude to the participation of women in the next war.”20 This ambivalence led to the chaos 
in the initial recruitment of women during the Second World War.  
Krylova states that “[t]hroughout 1941, rank-and-file male officials in military 
commissariats were on their own in deciding what to do with young women. There were 
neither clear orders nor general direction from the centre.” She argues that at this stage, the 
leadership neither encouraged women to volunteer nor prevented them from entering the 
armed forces.21 Stalin and his leadership were not willing to openly change their conservative 
position on the role of women, and did not wish to provide evidence for Nazi propaganda that 
stated that the Red Army was in such a desperate position that it recruited female 
battalions.22 The reality of the huge losses in the initial stages of the war, however, meant 
that recruitment of female combatants could not be ruled out. The leadership therefore 
                                                 
18 Markwick and Charon-Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline, 32.  
19 Pennington, “Offensive Women,” 779. 
20 Anne Eliot Griesse and Richard Stites, “Russia: Revolution and War” in Nancy Loring Goldman, ed., Female 
Soldiers— Combatants or Noncombatants?: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood, 1982), 61-84 (68).  
21 Krylova, Soviet Women in Combat, 28.  
22 For a discussion of the changing gender policy in the USSR see Wendy Goldman, Women, the State, and 
Revolution: Soviet family policy and social life, 1917-1936 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). For 
analysis of the Soviet reaction to German propaganda see Markwick and Charon-Cardona, Soviet Women on the 
Frontline, 44-46.  
decided to conduct covert recruitment of women into combat roles, and the first secret order 
which gave permission to form three women’s air regiments was issued on 8 October 1941.23 
The losses persisted, rapidly draining male resources; at the same time, there was no shortage 
of women willing to serve at the frontline. Necessity proved to be the mother of invention, 
and in 1942 militarization of women occurred on a mass scale. This stage of women’s 
recruitment however, as Markwick and Charon-Cardona argue “was not done with any 
fanfare.”24 “[I]n spring 1942, a second, secret phase of women’s mobilization […] was 
launched by Soviet authorities, desperate to compensate for nearly 6.5 million, 
overwhelmingly male, casualties.”25 The drive to militarize women on the one hand, and the 
official rhetoric that continued to emphasize that women’s primary responsibility was 
maternal resulted in the “stubborn official ambivalence towards women soldiers”.26 Women 
were thus encouraged to join the military, but their involvement in the army was not widely 
advertised and their position in the armed forces was often unclear. However, this did not 
prevent thousands of women from volunteering to enter the military and from going to the 
frontline.  
Many saw their contribution to the war effort in the context of the defense of their 
motherland. What constituted the motherland, however, differed for many of them. Some 
understood it in ideological terms propagated during the pre-war decades by the Komsomol, 
others were simply keen to defend their towns, villages and homes from the occupying 
                                                 
23 See “Prikaz NKO SSSR 0099 ot 08.10.41 g. O sformirovanii zhenskikh aviatsionnykh polkov VVS Krasnoi Armii”, 
[Order NKO SSSR 0099, dated 08.10.41, On the formation of women’s air regiments in the air force of the Red 
Army] in Markwick and Charon-Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline, 84-116. 
24 Markwick and Charon-Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline, 149. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 151. 
enemy.27 As Engel states, “Soviet citizens rallied to the defense of their homeland, some 
because of their feelings about the government, the Communist party, and the leadership of 
Joseph Stalin, others despite their feelings.”28 There were also, however, women whose 
mobilization was not strictly voluntary: some Komsomol members simply received a draft to 
join the army. Feoktista Rabina from Novosibirsk was one of them: 
I was summoned by the call of the Party. […] I came to work and they told me that a 
draft card was waiting for me. I was told: “here is your referral to the city Party 
committee.” I took it and went there. They met me there and said: “you have to go to 
the frontline”. I thought, “How can I go to the frontline if I am not a nurse, don’t have 
medical education?” […] But I was a candidate for party membership. […] So they sent 
me to work for the KGB.29 
Women went to the front not only out of patriotic duty or the call of the Party, but for a 
variety of other reasons. Markwick and Charon-Cardona argue that “some young women 
wanted revenge; some yearned for excitement; others were lonely or simply anxious to 
escape the appalling deprivation and duress of life on a half-starved home front.”30 Like men, 
women had no say in where they would be posted, but their gender meant that they were 
viewed not as soldiers in their own right, but as substitutes for men.  
Recruitment of women to fight in the Donbas has also been characterized by chaos 
                                                 
27 Interviewee Hanna Kolomiitseva, 8 June 2016, Kyiv; Interviewee Feoktista Rabina, 8 June 2016, Kyiv; 
Interviewee Anna Bebykh, 12 November 2015, Kyiv; Interviewee Halyna Pavlikova, 8 November 2015, L’viv.  
28 Engel, “The Womanly Face of War,” 138.  
29 Interviewee Rabina.  
30 Markwick and Charon-Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline, 180. 
and lack of clear information.31 In the Maidan protests, which preceded the start of the 
hostilities in eastern Ukraine, women were often marginalized, encouraged to fulfil 
traditionally feminine roles as cooks and carers and presented as helpers of male 
revolutionaries, despite the fact that they took a very active part in the protests.32 As soon as 
the protests in central Kyiv had ended, the conflict in the Donbas began, and some of the 
most active participants of the protests departed for eastern Ukraine from the still upturned 
Independence Square, the main site of the protests. They formed the core of the volunteer 
battalions, and included women. Among them was Iuliia Tolopa, an 18-year-old Russian 
national and nationalist, who came to Kyiv to see if the portrayal of events in Ukraine by the 
media in her own country corresponded to reality.33 On the Maidan, her Russian nationalism 
evolved into Ukrainian one, and she decided to fight on the side of the Ukrainian state and 
joined one of the buses heading to the “ATO zone”. She said that when she got to Luhans’k, 
a battalion commander decided who out of those who had arrived on the bus should be 
accepted to serve in his battalion and who should be sent back. Tolopa passed the “test”; she 
                                                 
31 For a discussion of the military conflict in eastern Ukraine see Serhy Yekelchyk, The Conflict in Ukraine: What 
Everyone Needs to Know, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Andrew Wilson, Ukraine Crisis: What It 
Means for the West (London: Yale University Press, 2014).  
32 See Olesya Khromeychuk, “Negotiating Protest Spaces on the Maidan: A Gender Perspective,” Journal of 
Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society 2(1), (2016): 9-47; Olesya Khromeychuk, “Gender and Nationalism 
on the Maidan,” in David R. Marples and Frederick V. Mills, eds., Ukraine’s Euromaidan. Analyses of a Civil 
Revolution (Stuttgart: Ibidem, 2015), 123-145; Sarah D. Phillips, “The Women’s Squad in Ukraine’s Protests: 
Feminism, Nationalism and Militarism on the Maidan,” American Ethnologist 41(3), (2014): 414-426; Olga 
Onuch and Tamara Martsenyuk, “Mothers and Daughters of the Maidan: Gender, Repertoires of Violence, and 
the Division of Labour in Ukrainian Protests,” Social, Health, and Communication Studies Journal. 
Contemporary Ukraine: A case of Euromaidan 1(1), (2014): 105-26. 
33 Interviewee Iuliia Tolopa, 9 June 2016, Kyiv. 
was given a rifle and started to fulfil combat duties.34 At first, Tolopa served as a rifleman [sic 
– strilets’] and later became an infantry fighting vehicle commander. Her position at the 
frontline was illegal, not only because of her gender, but also because of her nationality.35 
Another woman who went straight to the warzone from the Maidan was Andriana 
Susak. Like Tolopa, she joined a volunteer battalion. With the non-de-guerre “Malysh” (Kid), 
she served as a storm trooper (shturmovyk), but was officially registered as a seamstress.36 
This peculiar situation can be explained by the fact that the recruitment of women into the 
armed forces in Ukraine is regulated by the restricted list of occupations that are open to 
women.37 This meant that until June 2016, servicewomen were formally accepted onto a 
limited number of positions in the military, performing traditionally feminine tasks such as 
                                                 
34 Iuliia Tolopa in “My znaishly rosiis’ku BMP, i ia stala komandyrom – rosiianka z ‘Aidaru’,” [We found a 
Russian infantry fighting vehicle, and I became a commander – Russian woman from “Aidar”], Hromads’ke 
Radio, 15 October 2015, https://hromadskeradio.org/en/programs/hromadska-hvylya/my-znayshly-rosiysku-
bmp-i-ya-stala-komandyrom-rosiyanka-z-aydaru, accessed 14 June 2017.  
35 Interviewee Tolopa. In 2015, the number of foreign nationals fighting on the side of the Ukrainian state in 
the Donbas region was estimated at over a thousand. See Sviatoslav Khomenko, “‘Inozemnyi lehion’ po-
ukrains’ky: khorosha novyna chy zakon bez sensu,” [“Foreign Legion” Ukrainian-style: good news or a 
meaningless law?], BBC Ukrainian, 7 October 2015, para. 7, 
http://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/politics/2015/10/151007_ukr_army_foreigners_sx, accessed 14 June 2017.  
36 Andriana Susak in “Viina na Donbasi ochyma ukrains’kykh zhinok u dokumental’nomu fil’mi ‘Nevydymyi 
batalion’,” [The war in the Donbas as witnessed by Ukrainian women in the documentary film “The Invisible 
Battalion”], Ukraine Crisis Media Center, 9 June 2017, http://uacrisis.org/ua/57284-nevidimij-
bataljon#prettyPhoto/0/, accessed 11 June 2017.  
37 See Decree No 337, Tymchasovyi perelik viis’kovo-oblikovykh spetsial’nostei riadovoho, serzhants’koho i 
starshyns’koho skladu z urakhuvanniam tykh, na iaki dozvoliaiet’sia pryznachaty viis’kovosluzhbovtsiv-zhinok, 
ta vidpovidnykh im viis’kovykh zvan’ i taryfnykh rozriadiv posad,” [Interim list of staff positions for privates, 
sergeants, sergeants-major, including those, for which the appointment of female military personnel is 
permitted, and the corresponding ranks and wage categories], Ministerstvo Oborony Ukrainy, 27 May 2014, 
http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/z0600-14#n16, accessed 14 June 2017. 
that of a nurse, musician, librarian, accountant, hairdresser, tailor, baker, chef, etc.38 The law, 
however, was observed mostly on paper. The initial high losses of the army, the widespread 
evasion from conscription and a steady flow of female volunteers willing to go to the frontline 
meant that the commanders on the ground accepted women and gave them the tasks they 
were most suited for, disregarding their gender and the official regulations.39 Therefore, when 
it came to recruitment, the commanders in the Donbas, like those in the Red Army were left 
to their own devises, improvising according to immediate circumstances. Women therefore 
ended up serving not only in “permitted” positions, but also as combat fighters, 
reconnaissance officers, snipers, etc. However, they either had no documentation at all, and 
thus were at the frontline illegally, or found themselves in a semi-legal position by being 
registered as office administrators, chefs, accountants, etc., while performing other duties.40 
Two years into the conflict and following much pressure from female veterans, the list 
regulating women’s recruitment was expanded by 63 positions and included jobs such as 
sniper, driver, gunner, reconnaissance agent and others, making it possible to legalize some 
of the women who were already performing these tasks.41 Nevertheless, as Tamara 
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serzhants’koho i starshyns’koho skladu z urakhuvanniam tykh, na iaki dozvoliaiet’sia pryznachaty 
Martsenyuk, Ganna Grytsenko and Anna Kvit argue, “[t]wo-thirds of all military positions 
remain inaccessible for women in Ukraine,” and the expansion does not apply to all branches 
of the armed forces or to positions at officer level.42  
As in the case of the Red Army, the women who volunteered to fight in the Donbas 
did so for different reasons. Motivations ranged from a feeling of guilt and helplessness as 
their compatriots were risking their lives on the frontline to following their children or 
partners who were already in the military, to hoping to build their own military careers.43 
Many also spoke of the desire to fight for Ukraine, but as in the case of the Red Army women, 
this did not always translate into loyalty to the state or a particular ideology; it rather referred 
to the idea of the defense of motherland and people (narod).44 As in the Red Army, the actual 
roles women performed in the Ukrainian army defied traditional gender norms, but women 
continued to be perceived as an auxiliary force temporarily helping men to fight the war.  
The roles women played in both cases are difficult to separate into categories of 
combat and non-combat. Enloe argues that the problem lies in the fact that the term combat 
is “infused with patriarchal understandings of masculinity (that is, what femininity is not)”.45 
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She specifically addresses the question of servicewomen who are not registered as 
combatants, but whose roles require them to be located in the combat zone: “[n]urses, in 
practice, have served in combat regardless of official prohibitions banning their presence 
there. They have served in combat not because of unusual individual bravery – the stuff of 
nursing romances – but because they have been part of a military structure that has needed 
their skills near combat.”46 The Second World War saw not only Soviet female pilots, snipers 
and gunners, but also non-combatants deployed at the frontline and in direct danger. 
According to Pennington, “[m]ore than 40 percent of all Red Army doctors, surgeons, 
paramedics, and medical orderlies, and 100 percent of nurses, were women.”47 Engel argues 
that “[o]nly the troops themselves had greater casualties than women physicians who served 
with rifle battalions”.48 In the case of the conflict in the Donbas, officially, the term “woman 
combatant” was an oxymoron, yet in reality “seamstresses,” “accountants” and “office 
managers” were used in combat.  Andriana Susak explains her situation at the frontline:  
My commander came and said: “Andriana, we need to make a combat order. 
Everyone is being registered as part of the fire support company. How on earth can 
we explain that we have a seamstress [at the frontline]?” And I said: “tell them that I 
am sewing socks for the boys. Include me at least into one combat order for all the 
time I have spent in the warzone.”49 
The commanders, therefore, were fully aware of the precariousness of their servicewomen’s 
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position who performed combat roles.50  
 The cases of the Red Army and of the Ukrainian Armed Forces confirm, albeit 
differently, the reluctance of military officials to reconcile the reality of servicewomen’s 
experiences with their official position in the military hierarchy. Enloe states that “to close 
the gap between myth and reality would require military officials to resolve their own 
ideological gender contradictions, something many are loathe to do.”51 Thus, in both cases, 
although women ended up fulfilling a great variety of roles, those in traditionally feminine 
jobs were perceived as helping the men to fight the war, while those performing combat 
duties, were seen as male substitutes, engaging in these positions temporarily and only due 
to the circumstances, and their exceptionality was emphasized. In both cases, there was a 
degree of secrecy when it came to the recruitment of women: their contribution was 
accepted, but not widely advertised.  
Jean Bethke Elshtain states that “[w]ar is a structure of experience”.52 We tell war 
stories in order to make sense of war experiences. These stories, in turn, perpetuate our 
understanding of war, including its gender order. Elshtain argues that although the accepted 
view of women is of “the noncombatant many” – “embodying values and virtues at odds with 
war’s destructiveness, representing home and hearth and the humble verities of everyday 
life” – there also exist tales of the “ferocious few,” that is “women who reversed cultural 
expectations by donning warrior’s garb and doing battle”.53 However, as Elshtain points out, 
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“their existence as fact and myth seems not to have put much of a dent in the overall edifice 
of the way war figures in the structure of male and female experience and reactions.”54 As 
both cases studied here demonstrate, fulfilling “masculine” duties did not guarantee being 
treated the same as men. In a situation where labor in the military is divided according to 
traditional perceptions of gender roles, a soldier of even the lowest rank is likely to have a 
higher standing than a woman, regardless of the nature of her actual involvement in the 
army. An assumption that participation in the military can grant marginalized groups, 
including women, a chance to acquire full citizenship, and, subsequently, a greater degree of 
equality has been criticized by scholars and refuted by numerous examples in history.55 The 
two cases discussed here demonstrate not only that “exceptional” women did not necessarily 
acquire full citizenship, but point to the fact that this very “exceptionality” sometimes 
prevented them from attaining the respect of society guided by gender stereotypes. The 
labels that were applied to them also extended to the “ordinary” servicewomen.  
One of the popular tropes in stories of Red Army servicewomen is their supposed 
promiscuity. Red Army women have frequently suffered from the label of a “field wife” 
(pokhodno-polevaia zhena, PPZh) and the assumption that they went to the frontline to find 
themselves a husband.56 Hanna Kolomiitseva, who served during the Second World War as a 
wireless operator/air gunner, recounted that her father made her promise not to form any 
intimate relationships in the military: “when I was joining the army, my father told me: ‘you 
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are my pure (chistaia) girl; I beg you to come back the same.’ I gave him my word. He said, 
‘don’t let anyone kiss you on the lips, only on your cheek.’ And that is what I did.”57 Given the 
ratio of women to men at the frontline, and that soldiers were granted leave only in the 
instance of serious wounding or “in exceptional cases for special achievements,” sexual 
relations at the front took many forms from consensual to coercive.58 The practice of securing 
a “field wife” was widespread: for woman, this often meant that one sexual partner, 
especially of a senior rank, would protect them from the sexual harassment of others; for 
men, especially in senior positions, this meant a feeling of entitlement to seek sexual favors 
from servicewomen under their command. Anna Bebykh, a searchlight operator during the 
Second World War, had to leave the hospital where she was being treated for her wounds 
prematurely because she was sexually harassed by a man in a senior position:  
When I was in hospital, I was harassed by one major. Can you imagine? He kept trying 
to kiss me. For goodness sake! I started to scream. I discharged myself from the 
hospital. I said to the doctor: “what is this?” and she answered: “well, they got 
accustomed to it.” I said: “who made them accustomed to it?” [and she answered]: 
“well, there are different people out there”.59 
It is notable here that Bebekh’s story includes not only complaints about men’s behavior, but 
also hints that women themselves were to blame for such behavior and confirms the 
widespread disregard for the so-called “field wives”. Although, as Pennington argues, “male 
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veterans seem more likely to categorize military women as “field wives”. Female veterans 
often distinguish between a small group of “field wives” and other women.”60  
Seven decades later, military women still find it difficult to avoid the assumption of 
promiscuity. Iryna Kosovs’ka, a member of the Ukrainian Volunteer Corps, explicitly compares 
the way women were perceived in the Second World War and how her contemporaries were 
viewed. She states that “both during and after World War II many women who had served in 
the army faced unfounded insults, gossip, and humiliation based on the assumption of their 
promiscuity.” She continues by arguing that such views are still held in Ukraine today: “Many 
elderly women I encountered claimed that promiscuity was the only reason why a girl would 
join the army.”61 The perception of women who come to the frontline as potential sexual 
partners rather than military comrades also persists among military men. This creates the 
need to secure a “protector” against others’ sexual harassment, thereby creating a modern-
day equivalent of the so-called “field wife”. Although such semi-consensual relationships put 
women into precarious positions, and make them highly dependent on their male partners, 
as Marta Havryshko argues, violence in military partnerships in the conflict zone receives little 
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attention because it occurs in context of mass extreme violence, where individual expressions 
of violence can seem insignificant.62 In the case of the conflict in the Donbas, with only a few 
exceptions, the discussion of gender-based violence perpetrated by “our boys” as opposed to 
by the enemy remains a taboo.  
 One of the reasons for the lack of discussion of mistreatment of women by their fellow 
military men is the heroicisation of military men and the adoption of militarized culture in 
which heteronormative militarized masculinity is celebrated and unchallenged. While the Red 
Army men were hailed as heroes, regardless of their actual achievements in the military, 
decorated women were often reluctant to wear their medals at victory parades, to avoid the 
accusation that their awards were not for the “combat services” but for “sexual favors” (“za 
boevye zaslugi”/”za polovye uslugi”). Zoia Nyzhnychenko, said that when she told people that 
she had served as a nurse during WWII, some replied “oh, yes, she served there, we all know 
how”.63 Women therefore preferred to hide their military past. Karen Petrone tells the story 
of Vera Malakhova, who also served as a nurse and even took part in the battle of Stalingrad:  
Her husband encouraged her to wear her medals to a May Day parade a few years 
after the war, saying “Put them on. You’re going with me, you earned them. I know 
everything there is about you, and you earned them honestly.” Nevertheless, when 
her husband lagged behind, a man accosted her, saying “Here comes a frontline 
W[hore]”.64 
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As this story demonstrates, a woman needed a man, in this case her husband, to “guarantee” 
her adequacy as a soldier, though even such guarantees did not protect her fully from the 
public perception.  
While women in contemporary Ukraine can talk about their experiences in the military 
more openly, their stories still cause a certain degree of discomfort in a society that largely 
expects women to be at home rather than fight in a war. Oksana Ivantsiv, one of the makers 
of a documentary film about women who fight in the Donbas, says that women find it hard 
to return from the warzone for the fear of being rejected by society:  
I heard stories about men who are ashamed to go to the train station to meet their 
wives who are coming back from the war, because they feel uncomfortable and do 
not know how to react. At the same time, we have completely opposite instances 
when men [returning from war] are welcomed as heroes.65 
The perception that women should not seem braver than men or be seen to take a leading 
role is internalized by servicewomen. Susak remembers when during one of the attacks she 
tried to encourage male recruits to come out of the hiding place:  
During one of the assaults, paratroopers hid under the “Ural” [a large army truck], we 
were fired at, and I had to motivate these young guys somehow. They were really 
young, twenty, twenty-two years of age. So, I come under this “Ural” and simply drag 
them out, saying: “let's go, there is no fire any more, let's go, don’t worry!” And they 
see that I am a woman. […] I am standing first in line, but the boys say, “look, at least 
go to the back, please.” And I say, “fine, you lead the way, it’s okay.”66 
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Thus, even in times of danger and when the inadequacy of gender stereotypes is obvious, 
both men and women are prepared to perform traditional masculinity and femininity in order 
not to disturb the gender order prevalent in the war and dominant outside of the warzone.  
Traditional gender norms do not get disturbed with any lasting results even by the 
existence of celebrated servicewomen such as the Red Army sniper L’udmyla Pavlichenko, or 
the Ukrainian pilot and participant of the war in Donbas Nadiia Savchenko. Both women might 
have made women’s presence in the warzone more visible, but this did not translate into 
significant practical improvements for the majority of women in the military.67 Individual 
women who were hailed as heroines were used instrumentally by their respective states. 
Markwick and Charon-Cardona argue that “Pavlichenko’s reputation as a lethal sniper was 
not just deployed on the battlefield or the home front. Soviet authorities clearly believed the 
“heroic” role of women in general and her reputation in particular could sway international 
public opinion in support of the war against the ‘fascist hordes’.”68 She represented the USSR 
in the USA, Canada and the UK, urging the Allies to open a second front in western Europe. 
The Sunday Mirror’s impression of Pavlichenko is very telling about the role she was supposed 
to fulfil as a soldier and as a woman. The 1942 article details the meeting between the 
“heroine of Russia’s [sic] front line” and “just a woman of Britain”: 
“I am Mrs. Collett,” she said to this sturdy, upright woman the world respects as a 
soldier. 
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Then she bent down, placed the flowers in Lieutenant Pavlichenko’s hands, and 
opened her mouth to speak. […] No words came. She wanted to say so much, but 
instead, she placed her hand on the soldier-woman’s shoulder and talked by looking 
into her eyes.  
Yes, they both understood – the mother and the soldier. To both of them that look 
meant that one day their children would be free to walk the streets in peace. The 
ordinary woman of Britain was saying to her counterpart in Russia: “Thank you for 
helping that day nearer.69  
These two women, despite the fact that one of them had 300 kills as a sniper to her name, 
are still presented as women, contemplating the peaceful future as women should. 
The situation with Savchenko is not dissimilar. After she was captured in the Donbas 
she was put on trial in Russia for allegedly directing a mortar attack that killed two Russian 
journalists in eastern Ukraine and was sentenced to twenty-two years. She quickly became “a 
symbol both of a new chapter in Ukrainian history — and the ensuing stand-off between 
Russia and Ukraine.”70 The hashtag #freesavchenko was used by politicians, diplomats and 
activists in the conflict and became synonymous with a call to support Ukraine.71 Thus a 
woman who was once prevented from training to become a pilot because of the gender 
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restrictions in the Ukrainian military suddenly became heroic figure and an embodiment of 
Ukraine itself: resilient and defiant, but in need of international support.72  
The examples of Savchenko and Pavlichenko are indicative of a trend in which the 
roles women take on in the military have little influence on wider women’s emancipation. 
Both women served as role models for other women, but neither of them set herself the aim 
of ensuring gender equality in the army, and their experience and fame did not suffice to 
challenge the wider restrictions servicewomen faced. As Dombrowski argues, it would be 
naïve “to insist that women can transform military culture without understanding how 
military culture transforms ‘women’”.73 The examples of Savchenko and Pavlichenko, but also 
of the less “remarkable” women discussed above, demonstrate that participation alone, even 
in high numbers and in “masculine” roles, or as outstanding fighters, does not necessarily lead 
to the reform of the patriarchal culture of the military and beyond. On the contrary, the 
presence of women in the military as temporary helpers or substitutes for men can in fact 
serve to reinforce the gender order that is already in place.  
An acceptance of gender stereotypes is conducive to the celebration of traditional 
gender war roles, with the military man at the pinnacle of the hierarchy. Militarization of 
society, in turn, strengthens traditional gender order outside of the warzone. This vicious 
circle produces a situation in which women’s entrance into the military can only be publically 
visible on a symbolic level. It is difficult to imagine an exhibition telling the story of the USSR’s 
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involvement in the Second World War without the famous 1941 poster by Iraklii Toidze 
“Motherland is calling,” depicting a woman wrapped in red garb holding a piece of paper with 
the military oath on it. The army of loyal children is represented by the rifles behind the 
woman. While this symbolic image of a woman was omnipresent, the stories of real women 
were much harder to come by.  
The portrayal of woman not only as motherland but as a mother was widespread 
during the war. In the post-war years, when the Soviet population had to come to terms with 
colossal losses, the cult of motherhood only grew stronger. Post-war society, which 
understood heroism as an ultimate value, awarded women who gave birth to five or more 
children with the title of “Heroine mother”. Engel states that although in the post-war period 
“the state-controlled media continued to praise women for their accomplishments and 
sacrifices on the home front, it virtually effaced their military role. And in postwar 
monuments, fiction, art, and film the warrior is invariably male and only men fight at the 
front.”74  
The collapse of the USSR renewed an interest in the history of the war and women’s 
participation in it. Svetlana Alexievich’s Unwomanly Face of War caused a sensation in the 
post-Soviet countries and beyond, but outside of academic debate, its mark on the way 
servicewomen were perceived was limited.75 Even now it is difficult to find examples of 
popular rhetoric that challenges the previously established stereotypes. Although female 
veterans are becoming more and more visible as fewer male veterans are around to attend 
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the parades, much of the celebratory or commemorative practices related to the Second 
World War in the post-Soviet region are carried out under the slogan “thank you, grandad, 
for the victory” (spasibo dedu za pobedu). Women’s war stories are not excluded entirely, but 
as in the actual war, they take a subordinate place to the narratives about male soldiers.76 
In the context of the hostilities in eastern Ukraine, the representation of Ukraine’s 
military history became increasingly important for the state. Since the Maidan protests and 
throughout the conflict in the Donbas, representation of Ukrainian military men as modern-
day Cossacks has increased.77 Representation of women has continued to emphasize their 
symbolic and auxiliary place: on the one hand, they have been portrayed as symbols of 
motherland, and on the other, their image has been highly sexualized.78 Servicewomen have 
not been entirely invisible, but they also tended to be objectified, as in a series of so-called 
patriotic pin-ups depicting women in uniforms from various branches of the Ukrainian Armed 
Forces, widely circulated on the social media.79  
As the conflict progressed, the militarization of society became ubiquitously visible 
from the highly-gendered army recruitment posters on the streets of Ukraine–for instance, 
depicting a little girl saying “Daddy, will you defend me?”–to the fashion style of Ukrainian 
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politicians.80 Since the start of the conflict, President Petro Poroshenko could regularly be 
seen sporting a full military uniform. Battalion commanders-cum-people’s deputies preferred 
camouflage to business suits to attend parliamentary sessions. The former prime minister, 
Yulia Tymoshenko, while not wearing a real uniform, chose stylized military jackets for public 
appearances. This made a particularly uncomfortable sight given the dismal state of the 
Ukrainian army, which lacked basic uniforms, not to mention the total absence of uniform 
provisions for servicewomen at the frontline.81  
The militarization of society did not stop with politicians’ wardrobes. Since the start 
of the conflict in the Donbas, the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory (Ukrains’kyi instytut 
natsional’noi pam”iati, UINP), the central executive body operating under the Cabinet of 
Ministers has prepared a number of projects and exhibitions celebrating the military.82 Unlike 
in the case of the post-war representation of the Red Army, women were not excluded in the 
projects. On the contrary, a special exhibition entitled “War makes no exceptions. Female 
                                                 
80 See “Tatu, ty mene zakhystysh? – patriotychni plakaty v Sievierodonets’ku,” [Daddy, will you defend me? – 
Patriotic posters in Sievierodonets’k], Znaj.ua, 27 August 2016, https://znaj.ua/news/regions/15440/tatu-ti-
mene-zahistish-patriotichni-plakati-v-syevyerodonecku-foto.html, accessed 14 June 2017. 
81 Servicewomen in the Donbas struggled to find uniforms and shoes that fit them and had to either buy these 
items at their own expense or get them through volunteer organizations. In this, their situation was very 
similar to that of the Red Army women, who at least in the initial stages of the war, had to improvise with 
uniforms and army boots that were made to fit men and were mostly too large. See Berlins’ka, Martsenyuk, 
Kvit, and Grytsenko, “Nevydymyi Batal’ion”; Markwick and Charon-Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline; 
Aleksievich, U voiny ne zhenskoe litso.  
82 The UINP invented an epithet for the Ukrainian people – an army-nation (narod-viis’ko) – thereby 
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zakhysnyts’ zi sviatom! Ukraintsi – narod-viis’ko,” [Congratulations to the male and female defenders on the 
holiday! Ukrainians are an army-nation], Ukrains’kyi Instytut Natsional’noi Pam”iati, 2015, para. 1, 
http://www.memory.gov.ua/news/vitaemo-zakhisnikiv-i-zakhisnits-zi-svyatom-ukraintsi-narod-viisko, 
accessed 14 June 2017. 
history of the Second World War,” opened in 2016 and has been touring the country since. 
Among thirteen stories selected by the UINP to tell about women’s experiences are several 
about servicewomen, including three members of the Red Army.83 The exhibition recognizes 
that, during the Second World War, “at the frontline, women mastered all military 
professions: in aviation and the navy, in infantry and cavalry, intelligence, communications 
and medical care. There even appeared a linguistic problem, as words such as tank operator, 
infantryman, machine gunner had no feminine equivalent.”84 The UINP stresses that “the 
theme of the tragic and heroic women’s fates will also help to make connections with the 
participation of our female compatriots—the military, physicians, and volunteers—in the 
contemporary confrontation with Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine,” thus 
recognising the parallels between participation of women in the Second World War and in 
the ongoing military conflict.85 However, the exhibition does not raise the question of the 
gender inequality within which women functioned in both cases. The parallels highlighted by 
the UINP emphasize the victimhood and/or heroism of the women, but not the ongoing 
inadequacy of the legal system, provisions, and even the language used to describe 
servicewomen’s experiences both now and seventy years ago.86  
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The UINP continued to prepare exhibitions on the theme of war and Ukrainian military 
tradition and in 2016 it presented a project called “Warriors. History of the Ukrainian 
Military”.87 Two women were included among the twenty warriors displayed in the exhibition. 
One represented the women of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army,88 and the other depicted an 
actual “ATO” veteran, Iryna Tsvila, who was described on the poster as a “warrior of the ‘Sich’  
volunteer battalion”.89 The word “warrior” (voiak) is used in its masculine form, thus 
highlighting the preference of the official institutions to avoid feminization of military 
professions even in language.90  While the poster depicted a female warrior, did not even 
mention the participation of women more broadly in the volunteer battalions in the conflict 
in the Donbas. This partial visibility of women, therefore, strengthens the overall image of 
them as a symbolic and supportive force and emphasizes the prevalent ideas of gender roles.  
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sili-ukraini, accessed 13 June 2017. The “Sich” volunteer battalion was formed in June 2014. In December 
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90 For a discussion of the use of feminised forms in the Ukrainian language see Liudmyla Smoliar, “Try 
prychyny, chomu varto vzhyvaty feminityvy,” [Three reasons for using feminine forms], Ukrains’ka Pravda, 28 
October 2017, https://life.pravda.com.ua/columns/2017/10/28/227141/, accessed 16 January 2018.  
The conflicts discussed here resulted in militarization of their respective societies. In 
the USSR militarization was total with the economy and much of the population working 
exclusively for the needs of the army and the front.91 In Ukraine, the hostilities in the Donbas 
region, although of a much smaller scale, also encouraged militarization of many aspects of 
life.92 In such contexts, militarization of women was inevitable, and there were many women 
who, like men, chose to contribute to the war effort. However, the entrance of women into 
the military, in both cases, was seen as a contingent measure, for the duration of the conflict 
only. Pennington argues that  
while women were at the front, the Soviets instituted gender segregation in the 
educational system and the exclusion of women from the newly created Suvorov 
cadet schools. […] Performance was irrelevant to Soviet decision making about 
whether to allow women to remain in military service, and there is strong evidence 
that during the postwar period, the Soviet government deliberately obscured 
women’s wartime achievements.93  
Traditional gender roles were also reinforced outside of the military with heroicisation of 
motherhood and the strengthening of pronatalist policies.  
 In the case of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, it is too early to draw firm conclusions. 
There is evidence of some reforms, with the expansion of the list of restricted positions in the 
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92 Since the start of the conflict, the defense budget of Ukraine has seen a significant increase. Since 2016, it 
has been at 5% of GDP. See “Military Budget,” GlobalSecurity.org, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ukraine/budget.htm, accessed 15 June 2017.  
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army. Martsenyuk and Grytsenko point out that the Ministry of Defense has hired “an 
external gender expert, who works closely with the ministry representatives in different 
structures.”94 The reforms, however, have been introduced as a reaction to the situation on 
the ground and pressure from veterans and feminist activists and continue to be very limited. 
As in the case of the post-war USSR, much will depend on the general attitude to gender 
equality in Ukraine both of politicians in power and society more widely, which at the time of 
writing leaves much to be desired.95  The experience of women’s active participation in the 
Second World War, to some extent, shapes the understanding of women’s roles in war and 
provides role models for women who join the contemporary Ukrainian Armed Forces.96 At 
the same time, the instrumentalisation of women’s militarization, the prejudices, and the 
gender norms prevalent seventy years ago continue to play a part today.  
The cases discussed here point to the fact that militarization of women can not only 
fail in challenging gender stereotypes, but even result in their consolidation. In both cases, 
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the roles women occupied directly reflected the demands of the army, but their recruitment 
was chaotic and influenced by gender stereotypes. Women fought in the ranks of a state 
sanctioned military and saw their contribution to warfare as part of the defense of 
motherland. Their popular image, however, was more linked to the motherland itself than 
the warriors who defended it. Those women who challenged the stereotype of women as a 
supporting force did not escape being perceived as women first and foremost. Their 
exceptionality was instrumentalised by their respective states and simply served to prove the 
rule. The study of servicewomen’s experiences of warfare juxtaposed with popular 
perceptions of them leaves a pessimistic impression of the potential of militarization for 
women’s emancipation and gender equality. Joshua S. Goldstein argues that “the gender-war 
connection is very complex” and “none of us knows the correct direction or doctrine that will 
end war, equalize gender, or unlink war from gender.”97 He nevertheless believes that the 
“war system is not set in stone, nor driven by any simple formula, but is alive, complex, and 
changeable.”98 Understanding how gender roles came to be formed within war systems and 
why they change so little over the decades creates possibilities to examine how they can be 
altered in the future. 
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